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Robert Engen. Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the
Canadian Army, 1943-1945. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2016. Pp. 328.
Robert Engen’s Strangers in Arms is both a continuation and
expansion of his previous book Canadians Under Fire (2009). That
it builds on this earlier work is evident in Engen’s addressing of
Canadians Under Fire reviewer Dr. Howard Coomb’s observation
that the first book failed to consider sufficiently the training
regimens of Canadian soldiers as they prepared for combat during
the Second World War. Yet Engen provides plentiful new material as
he considers his subjects’ motivations, morale, and additional factors,
providing further understanding of the Canadian infantryman in the
Second World War. Students of combat performance will find much
to reinforce the widely-held conclusion that soldiers—at least those
from Western militaries, if not universally—have much in common
when it comes to what underlies individual motivation and collective
cohesion. Engen, however, also provides new insights, many,
unsurprisingly, related specifically to Canadian infantry soldiers.
The Canadians in the Second World War shared with their
British, American, and Australian counterparts the tumultuous
experience of preparing for combat during a massive expansion of
their armed forces in which the country saw its numbers in military
uniform increase more than one hundred-fold (p. 25). The Canadian
infantry shared several characteristics with its counterparts in
other militaries. For example, a Canadian soldier’s motivations lay
less in nationalism or patriotism than commitment to comrades to
his right and left as a unit moved forward in attack or readied to
repulse the foe (pp. 15, 31, 119). As well, morale suffered more due to
inactivity (p. 111), weather (pp. 110-112), and failures to receive mail
(pp. 75, 108) than combat losses (pp. 174-75). Other familiar points
that Engen correctly concludes merit re-mention in Strangers in
Arms include the value of informing men regarding their role in the
larger operational context and a reminder that post-traumatic stress
disorder need not be a product of combat experience alone (p. 207).
It is his less familiar insights that provide the basis for both
Engen’s title and several of his conclusions which are sure to cause
future students of the soldier in combat to reconsider heretofore
little questioned beliefs. Contrasting how Canadian tactical leaders
responded to the challenge of maintaining sufficient manpower in
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infantry units with the German Kampfengruppen approach, Engen
observes that it was the squad, platoon, and company levels at which
Canadians consolidated survivors from understrength organisations,
those returning after recovering from wounds, and others from
non-infantry specialties, reassigning these men in the ever-present
struggle to maintain sufficient combat power. Kampfengruppen, in
comparison, tended to be ad hoc combined arms units the size of a
company or larger (pp. 86, 156-57). It is from this phenomenon of
moulding units from men unfamiliar with each other that Engen
takes his title. He posits that the combination of a rapidly expanded
military force, little retention of geographic coherency when initially
forming regiments, and frequent reorganisation due to combat losses
made Canada’s Second World War infantryman a stranger among his
peers but a stranger who nonetheless fought effectively. He attributes
that success to what he calls “swift trust,” the rapid development of
faith in those who are fighting together despite a lack of longer-term
intimacy (pp. 204-07). While it may be that creating units from
cohorts with shared backgrounds, training, and service could result
in more effective unit performance, Engen convincingly argues that
such commonality is not essential to combat effectiveness at the
small unit level. It is an argument which merits further investigation
in future studies of performance under fire.
Engen highlights two factors which go far toward explaining why
swift trust found fertile ground in Canadian ranks. First was the
notably fewer (though at times still quite high) casualties suffered
by infantry non-commissioned officers above the rank of corporal
as compared to those in platoon commander ranks (pp. 29, 186-87).
Second is the army’s policy of “left out of battle” (lob) in which key
personnel (e.g., company seconds-in-command, platoon sergeants)
were deliberately not sent forward with attacking units so that
there would be personnel familiar with a unit and the nature of its
operations when others fell to the enemy (p. 124). This is again a
point worthy of consideration for those contemplating management of
combat units in conflicts yet to come.
The analytic approach behind such conclusions is noteworthy.
Engen first ensures his readers are knowledgeable regarding the
nature of Canada’s Second World War army and the factors making
its soldiers unique. Theirs was—as it still is—a country with language
and related cultural differences more pronounced than in most other
Western Commonwealth contingents fighting on the Allied side (p.
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248). French Canadians by and large fought in organisations where
French was the predominant language just as those whose primary
language was English found themselves in same-language units.
Differences went beyond language alone, with French Canadian
leaders tending to enforce discipline more strictly than their Englishspeaking counterparts. Some of Engen’s other findings are likely to
raise the occasional eyebrow such as evidence that combined arms
proficiency remained elusive throughout the war even as infantry
drills marked a Canadian strength (pp. 40, 56, 63, 104) and a belief
by Canadians in Italy that theirs was Europe’s “southern front”
rather than a neglected one (p. 109).
Shortcomings in this fine work number few and are minor in
substance. Better editing should have reduced the too-frequent
repetition of select findings. Readers need not be repeatedly reminded
of the effects mail, inaction, and weather had on morale. That those
effects were well established and shared on different battlefields
are points understood thanks to the first or second of their several
mentions. So too are cases of highlighting the Canadian belief in
the near sacredness of the volunteer vice conscription soldier. More
inquisitive readers will here and there question whether the author
assumes a bit too much (as in the case of what motivated two brothers
to join the ranks, p. 38). Elsewhere the logic oversteps, if ever so
slightly. While any “absence, desertion, and other forms of combat
refusal” are certainly cause for concern when found in infantry ranks,
to imply that leaders gave special emphasis to riflemen’s absenteeism
because they were at the sharp end implies that losses in other
ranks less affect combat success, logic not a few military leaders
would debate (p. 113). The book’s index is unfortunately little more
than a placeholder; too many key references and even the author’s
fundamental “swift trust” are not to be found therein.
The last is the more unfortunate because Engen’s research
effectively mines so broad a range of available material. It shares
something of the ambition and rigour characteristic of Samuel Stouffer’s
highly regarded studies of the Second World War American soldier.1 So
too, Engen covers ground in common with S.L.A. Marshall’s valuable
but significantly flawed Men Against Fire such as the influence of

1  
For example, see Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier: Combat and its
Aftermath, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949).
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individual relationships in infantry units.2 Like Anthony Kellet’s Combat
Motivation, Strangers in Arms seeks to improve our understanding of
soldier motivations.3 And, shared with this reviewer’s own consideration
of American soldier performance in Reading Athena’s Dance Card:
Men Against Fire in Vietnam, Engen recognises that only through
diligent study of those who experience it can one understand the
human condition in combat.4 Similar to these works but unique thanks
to its focus on the Canadian soldier, Engen harvests vital material
from wounded officers’ replies to questions completed soon after their
time on the frontline and censors’ summaries of soldiers’ revelations to
provide key underpinnings to Strangers in Arms analysis. These find
valuable complements in the restrained use of regimental histories and
select other materials as the author effectively walks around the table
to view his subjects’ experiences from multiple perspectives. Adroit
reference to official records further complements these to provide a
concise overview of Canadian soldier demographics as presented both
in the book’s main body and several appendices.
Any historian seeking to understand the minds and motives of
combat soldiers faces innumerable obstacles. Those conducting postevent reviews years after a conflict lose the rich ore of immediate
memory. Others mining contemporary materials as does Engen find
they can access only select veins of that ore; for example, it appears
only officers in hospital were surveyed for their views on Canadian
soldier performance in Second World War Europe, theirs being a
group likely to view topics such as the effectiveness of Canadian
leadership differently than might other ranks. Nevertheless, Engen
does much to push those obstacles aside in his efforts to better our
understanding of his subjects and, by extension, soldiers of other
countries. It is an understanding of interest to military historians,
those finding themselves responsible for manpower and training
policy, and anyone pondering the motives and experiences of homo
sapiens at war.
russell w. glenn, u.s. army training and doctrine command g2

2  
S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future
War (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978).
3  
Anthony Kellet, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (Boston:
Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982).
4  
Russell W. Glenn, Reading Athena’s Dance Card: Men Against Fire in Vietnam
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000).
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